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ADAPTIVE RATIONALITY:
AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE ON COGNITIVE BIAS
Martic G. I lasclton, Gregory A. Bryant, Andreas Wilke, David A. rrcderick,
Andrew Galpenn, Willem E. Frankenhuis, and Tyler Moore
University of California, Los Angeles

A casual look at the literature in social cognition reveals a vast collection
of biases, errors, violations of rational choice, and failures to maximize
utility. One is tempted to draw the conclusion that the human mind is
woeiully muddled. We present a three-category evolutionary taxonomy of
evidence of biases: biases are (a) heuristics, (b) error management effects,
or (cl experimental artifacts. We conclude that much of the research on
cognitive biases can be profitably reframed and understood in evolutionary
terms. An adaptationist perspective suggests that the mind is remarkably
well designed for important problems of survival and reproduction, and not
fundamentally irrational. Our analysis is not an apologia intended to place
the rational mind on a pedestal for admiration. Rather, it promises practical
outcomes including a clearer view of the architecture of systems for judgment and decision making, and exposure of clashes between adaptations
designed for the ancestral past and the demands of the present.

By casually browsing journals in the social sciences one can discover a collection
of human biases, errors, violations of rational choice, and failures to maximize
utility. Papers published in Social Cog11itio11 are illustr,1tive. In just 2007, the journal
published a special issue dedicated to the hindsight bias, which is the tendency
to belie\C that events that have occurred are more probable when assessing them
after the fact than when estimating them prospectively (Blank, Musch, & Pohl,
2007). Other examples include misapprehensions of probability like the hot hand
fallacy that leads people to erroneously believe that basketball players who hm e
shot several successful baskets are more likely to succeed on the next try (Gilovich,
Vallone, & Tvcrsky, 1985). There are also many effects of emotion purported to
cloud good judgment (e.g., Leith & Baumeister, 1996), overuses of stereotypes
(Ross & Nisbett, 1991), misapprehensions of the motives of members of the opposite sex (Abbey, 1982), common violations of monetary utility in behavioral ecoCorrl'"p<mdencc concerning this article should be addrc.;sc.J to Martic G . Haselton, Department of
Communication Studic,.,, University of California, Los Angele:., Box 951538, Rolfe Hall, Room 2322,
I os Angele..-., CA 90095. r-mail: haselton@ucla.edu .
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nomic games (Camerer, 2003; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), and distortions
of memory (Loftus, 2004).
Consider the hindsight bias as an illustration. In studies demonstrating the
hindsight bias, participants first estimate the likelihood that certain events will
occur. A hindsight bias is found when individuals later report that their likelihood
estimate was higher for events that did occur and lower for events that did not
(Fischhoff, 2007). For example, if an initial skeptic recalled that her judgment of Barack Obama's likelihood of winning the 2008 presidential election was higher than
her actual initial estimate, she would have committed the hindsight bias. There are
several possible explanations for such an effect: the bias could be (1) a byproduct
of an otherwise useful wa} of thinking, (2) an artifact of research designs that produce apparent flaws in thinking that arc actually unlikely to happen in the natural
world, or (3) a genuine error or fla\o\ in the mind (Haselton & Funder, 2006).
The general tendency in psychology is to interpret the supposedly incorrect
iudgment or reasoning in terms of the last of these categories-as a genuine error or flaw in the mind, perhaps resulting from some sort of cognitive limitation
(Lopes, 1991; also see Krueger & Funder, 2004, for a recent review). From an evolutionary perspective, however, it would be surprising if the mind were really so
woefully muddled. The mind is an intricate, evolved machine that has allo\o\ ed
humans to inhabit and exploit an incredible range of em ironments. Humans effectively solve a variety of social-ecological problems including large-scale cooperation, social exchange, habitat formation, agriculture, and cumulative culture.
We are a remarkably intelligent species, capable of surviving and reproducing in a
complicated and ever-changing world. Could it really be that the human mind is
as deeply flawed as the literature suggests?
Knowledge of biases and illusions is of course valuable. For example, demonstrating that a bias may occur in some situations but not others (context effects),
or with certain classes of information and not others (content effects), can reveal
structural features of the mind. Addit1onally, knowledge of biases and illusions
may have important practical utility by preventing undesirable outcomes. For example, a pilot approaching a runway under conditions of reduced visibility might
be subject to fatal visual illusions (Waldock, 1993). Nonetheless, we believe that
the pendulum has swung too far away from documenting good judgment and decisions (also sec Funder, 1987; Haselton & Funder, 2006; Krueger & Funder, 2004).
In this paper we outline an evolutionary perspective that reexamines biases and
may cause the pendulum to swing back toward the center, shifting the focus away
from flaws and toward an understanding of how natural selection-the process
that generates functional design in nature-has shaped the human mind. This perspective leads to serious questions about whether evidence of bias and error reveals irrationality, and can teach surprising lessons about adaptive ways humans
have evolved to think. We first consider what we should expect the mind to do
well and then introduce a three-category evolutionary taxonomy of bias effects.
Biases might be l1e11ri!>tics, error management lffects, or experimental artifacts. We conclude with a discussion of the benefits of reconsidering evidence of irrationality in
an evolutionary light.
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WHAT SHOULD HUMANS DO WELL?
SOCIALITY, ECOLOGY, AND THE ADAPTIVE
PROBLEMS OF OUR ANCESTORS
It is useful to begin by considering reasonable hypotheses about what the mind
has evolved to do well. Humans are an intensely social species, and thus should
possess cognitive machinery designed to handle the computational problems associated with social life. For example, because people engage in reciprocal social
interactions with nonrelatives, we should expect a suite of cognitive adaptations
designed to reason effectively about social exchanges (e.g., cheater detection; for a
comprehensive review, see Cosmides & Tooby, 2005). ln a ll domains of social reasoning we should see a variety of adaptive designs including evaluating commitment and sexual interest in prospective mates, diagnosing personality, navigating
social hierarchies, learning from knowledgeable conspecifics, and so on (Haselton
& Funder, 2006).
We should also expect the human mind to reason most effectively when presented with ecologically valid problems of the sort our human ancestors would
have been likely to encounter (Tooby & DeVore, 1987). These include problems in
particular content domains, such as those listed above, and in the informational
formats present over human evolutionary history. For example, asking research
participants to perform logical operations over abstract inputs (e.g., probabilities)
or in artificial settings should be particularly likely to reveal apparent lapses in
rational thinking (Gigerenzer, 1998). Concrete, naturalistic problems in domains
such as parenting, mate choice, social exchange, social learning, and the like are
the places where we should focus for evidence of adaptive specialization.
Lastly, an evolutionary perspective raises questions about the assumptions many
psychologists hold about what counts as rational. Our human ancestors needed to
find mates and reproduce, avoid getting killed, protect their families, avoid diseases, and obtain resources. Psychological mechanisms that have evolved to achieve
these ends might not perform well against modem standards of monetary maximization and subjective well being, such as finding happiness, being "logical," or
even representing the truth.

DOES ADAPTIVE= TRUTHFUL?
Traditionally, it was thought that humans differed from animals in that they were
gifted with a propensity to uncover and strive for truth, or some version of it,
such as correct judgment and logical inference. In fact, many theorists today still
think along these lines, often implicitly, but in some cases explicitly. Fodor (2000),
for example, recently declared, "there is nothing in the 'evolutionary,' or the 'biological,' or the 'scientific' worldview that shows, or even suggests, that the proper
function of cognition is other than the fixation of true beliefs" (p. 68). In a recent
exchange with Fodor, Pinker (2005a; also see Fodor, 2005; Pinker, 2005b) pointed
out that the process of natural selection is not concerned with truth per se, and in
some instances even disfavors a truth-seeking mind. For example, there are many
adaptive problems in which the best solution sacrifices costly truth-seeking in fa-
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vor of fast approximations. Moreover, beliefs play an important role in our social
life, so pure inference is not the only function they serve. As Pinker (200Sa) noted,
"People are embraced or condemned according to their beliefs, so one function of
the mind may be to hold beliefs that bring the belief-holder the greatest number of
allies, protectors, or disciples, rather than beliefs that are most likely to be true" (p.
18). The conviction that one's own social group is somehow special, or even better
than other comparable groups (e.g., Chow, Lowery, & Knowles, 2008), or the belief
that one's current partner is the most amazing and irreplaceable person in the
world (e.g., Murray, Holmes, Dolderman, & Griffin, 2000) could lead the believer
to behave m ways that might contribute to his or her social success (e.g., conferring
privileges to in-group members could lead to repeated exchange interactions benefiting all parties, or investing in a romantic partner might result in the production
of viable offspring, etc.).
In order to generate adaptive beha,•ior, the brain will sometimes use heuristic
reasoning procedures, make fallible assumptions about the world, and hold false
beliefs. As philosopher Patricia Churchland (1987) remarked, "The principal function of nervous systems is ... to get the body parts where they should be in order
that the organism may survi\·e .... Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost" (pp. 5-18-5-19). The idea that the primary function of the brain is to generate
true beliefs and valid inferences is, of course, not entire!}' wrong. An organism that
always made im·alid judgmenb nnd fabe inferences could not be very successful.
But this is quite different from claiming that the brain essentially strives for truth,
as if it were ernlutionarily optimized for arriving at truthful judgments and logical inference. From an evolutionary perspective, truth should matter only to the
degree that it contributes to survival and reproductive success.

AN EVOLUTIONARY TAXONOMY OF COGNITIVE BIASES
Earlier we outlined three explanations of apparent cognitive biases: (1) byproducts
of an otherwise useful way of thinking, (2) artifacts of research designs that produce apparent flaws in thinking that are actually unlikely to happen in the natural
world, or (3) genuine errors or flaws in the mind. From an evolutionary perspech\ e, effects in the third category can occur in individuals as a result of novel mutations or developmental defects. They can also arise as human universals due to
suboptimal "kluge" solutions produced by a selection process that must innovate
on the basis of random mutations and build upon existing structure (see Marcus,
2008). One well-known universal suboptimal design is in the visual system the
retina is installed batkwards, producing a blind spot in each eye (Marcus, 2008;
Williams, 1992). l lowever, clear examples of such kluges arc relatively rare in comparison to the many systems that appear exceptionally well-designed; and, while
suboptimal, kluge solutions like the retina perform surprisingly well. In sum, we
acknowledge the existence of genuine flav.::s in the design of the mind, but we
contend that these flaws will be relatively rare or comparatively minor aspects of
systems that are otherwise well adapted.
Leaving aside the notion that the mind is riddled with major flaws, we are left
with the idea that apparent biases either reflect the operation of generally useful systems or arc artifacts of research designs. The evolutionary taxonomy we
present subdivides the former group into two categories. The first, heurist1cs, are
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generally effective, often simple rules of thumb whose operations entail some
limitations. This is the explanation of biases favored b) most researchers in social
cognition, including those who tend to vie\-\ the mind as flawed. We\-\. ill argue,
however, that only a limited number of biases are likely to fit into this category and
that many heuristics are amazing!} more effecti,·e than complex decision-making
strategics. The second, effects of error-111a11age111c11t, are cases in which errors that
were less costly over evolutionary history are favored over more expensive ones,
producing biases in the direction of the less costly error (Haselton & Buss, 2000). A
large number of new phenomena have been documented as a result of theorizing
about error management, demonstrating the utility of this way of reconceptualizing the judgment strategies we should expect to find in the mind (Haselton &
Nettle, 2006). The remaining category, artifacts, are biases or errors that result from
research strategies in which people are given problems in unnatural formats or are
evaluated on the basis of questionable normative standards. Surprisingly, many
of the most famous biases might fall into this category. Table 1 summarizes the
taxonomy (,1lso see Haselton & Funder, 2006; Haselton, Nettle, & Andrews, 2005).
These taxonomic designations are not intended to organize bias phenomena into
mutually cxclusi\ e categories. For example, as we discuss below, some heuristics
may contain an error management component. Rather, we present the taxonomy
as a way of organizing e' idence of bias and error in order to evaluate the extent to
which it indicates irrationality.
We ultimately rnnclude that the mind is best described as adaptively rational.
By adaptt,cly rational we mean that the mind shows evidence of psychological
design for coping with recurrent adaptive problems our ancestors encountered
over evolutionary history-the mind is equipped with mechanisms that are constrained and sometimes imprecise, but nevertheless clear products of natural selection sho\\ ing e\ 1dence of good design. This definition runs in contrast to the
often implicit definitions of rationality used by many social science researchers,
including that the mind should maximize "accuracy," happiness, well-being, financial return, or adherence to abstract rules of logic. We do not deny that it is
useful to compare human performance to these standards, as they may be those
we wish to maximize in the modem \.VOrld. Instead, we challenge the idea that deviations of performance from the standards means that the human mind is deeply
flawed or poorly designed.
It is also important here to clarify the difference between proximal and distal
causation. In social cognition, researchers often refer to "motivated reasoning"
that benefits the self (e.g., Taylor & Brown, 1988) or is good for relationships (e.g.,
Murray ct al., 2000). Although much of this evidence is well accepted, it also can
be viewed as contradicting some definitions of rationality- particularly those espousing maximal accuracy. A reasonable question is the extent to which these more
standard social cognitive explanations for biases arc altern"1tives to evolutionary
explanations for biases. We view them as complementary and typically operating
at different le,·els of causation. Whereas many of the evolutionary explanations we
offer in this paper make reference to causation in deep time that has shaped the
mechanisms of the mmd, social-cognitive explanations usually refer to causation
occurring in "near-time" involving contemporaneous motives and goals.
For example, people ""ill often differentially recall enmts from their past that
confirm a posith e opinion they have about themselves, such as remembering more
academic successes than failures, which confirms one's status as a good student
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TABLE 1. Evolutionary Taxonomy of Evidence of Bias and Error
Cause of Apparent Bias

Examples

---------~-

1/t •LJfl< t1c· Heuristics are ett1dent solutions to

probll'n1' of Judgment and choice when time,
knowledge, and intormatron processing capacitics .ire c:onstra1nl'd (e.g.. Gigerenzer, Todd, &
tht• ABC Rewar<.h Group, 1999). Heuristics
wor~ well in most circumstances but can (,iii in
systt>m,itic w.iys. Apparently poor periormante
results when heuristics are studied in ,1bsence
of environmental context.

lrmr 1\1.in.1genwnt; Sele<.tion favors bias toward
the IPss rnstly error (I iaselton & Buss, 2000).
hror m.111,1gement causes overall rates ol error
to increase, though net costs are minimized.
Artifact: App.1rpnt biases and errors are artilacts of

research strategies. Biases result from the appl
cation ot inappropriate norms {e.g., Cosm1de<
& Tcx>h\, 19961 or the placement of humans in
unn,itur.il <cttmgs.

• One-rc•ason decision strategies, such as the
rt'Cognition heuristic tGigerenzer & Goldstein,
19%)
• Hindsight bias as memory updating (Hoffrage
et al., 2000)
• Default assumption of nonindependence (an
ad,1pt.11ion to dumped resources, Wilke & Barrcll, 2009)
• Auditor> looming (e.g .. Neuhoff, 1998)
• Defense overrespon<1veness (e.g., Nesse, 2001)
• S(·xual overperception by men (Haselton &
Buss, 2000)
• Some instances of b.ise-rate neglect (Hertwig &
Gigcrenzer, 1<J99J
• Some instance~ of confirmation bias tCosmides,
1989)

(e.g., Kunda, 1987). Re-;carchers have attributed this to motivated reasoning-that
is, a tendency to evaluate evidence in a manner that leads to a desirable assessment. Proximately, people might indeed be motivated in such a way, but this docs
not fully explain the phenomenon. Evolutionary-based ultimate explanations often incorporate proxunate motivations as means to adaptive ends. In this example,
the moti\ation to maintain a positive self-assessment via a biased recall process
might contribute to better performance, across a variety of domains, than either a
negative assessment, or an unbiased one (Nettle, 2004; also see Taylor & Brown,
1988). Enhanced performance, in tum, can lead to a variety of fitness benefits, including attracting mates or social allies and gaining access to resources. It's not
that people just "want" to believe it-believing it actually helps them.
HEURISTICS
FROM HEURISTICS-AND-BIASES TO A
STUDY OF MINDS-IN-ENVIRONMENTS

Most researchers in social cognition favor the view that heuristics are simple, efficient shortcuts applied in judgment and decision-making when people face overly
complex tasks, have limited time or cognitive ab iii ty, or deal with incomplete information in the world. ln this light, heuristics work well in many instances, but are
prone to break down in systematic ways-and whenever they do, more "evidence"
has been found that the mind is flawed in its reasoning abilities. The traditional
treatment of heuristics has been largely dominated by researchers working within
the heuristics and biases program (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974), who have argued that human judgment often substantially
de\ 1ates from optimality predictions or normative standards of logic. Classic ex-
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amples in this school of thought demonstrate the poor performance of research
participants judging sequences of coin flips or making probability estimates about
the likelihood of situations described in word vignettes. This program, however,
generated much controversy when researchers questioned \'\ hether the proposed
heuristics were sufficiently precise to be useful model.., of psychological functioning and whether the tools used to assess the functioning of the mind were ecologically valid and therefore capable of yielding irn>ights into the adequacy of everyday decision-making (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1991, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996).
A fundamental criticism of the heuristics and biases program is that researchers might be neglecting the structure of the world in which the decision-making
takes place. Ecologically-minded scientists have argued that in order to understand the mind's true cognitive abilities one needs to consider the environment in
which it operates-or was designed to operate by natural selection. For example,
Egon Brunswik (1955) emphasized that psychologists should study how the mind
makes inferences based on the informational cues present in the natural environment, and Roger Shepard (2001) saw the mind as a mirror reflecting regularities
of the physical world (see Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007). Consequently, what we call
a good or a bnd decision (or rnt1onnl or 1rrntionnl behavior) has to be judged with regard to specific decision environments rather than in a vacuum (Gigerenzer, Todd,
& the ABC Research Group, 1999).
A related criticism addresses how much information is usually available in
these decision environments and if the clear standard for comparing decision
outcomes-the supposedly optimal way of thinking-should necessarily be informed by abstract standards of probability, logic, and mathematical optimization.
Many traditional models of rational choice assume that humans (and animals)
make inferences about the world virtually as if they were supernatural beings that
have unlimited reasoning power, boundless knowledge, and unlimited time to
make their decisions. However, real-world decision environments, both current
and past, do not look like this and it is unrealistic to compare the human capacity
for judgment and choice against such optimality predictions and assumptions (see
Gigerenzer ct al., 1999). For example, humans almost never have access to all of the
pertinent information needed for making a decision about which mate to choose,
what foods are best to eat, or which house to buy. Rather than following models
of unbounded rationality, researchers pointed out that many decisions are made
in a boundedly rational way (i.e., under conditions of limited time, information,
and cognitive processing) and that heuristics are psychologically plausible solutions in situations where the one best solution does not exist or cannot be reached
anyhow.
COGN ITIV[ LIMITATIONS CAN BE BENEFICIAL

Researchers have produced many new empirical findings by examining reasoning
in concrete environments and incorporating the realistic everyday constraints decision-makers face in a world that favors bounded rationality (Todd, Gigerenzer, &
the ABC Research Group, in press). Numerous experiments and a range of formal
simulations have shown that a whole famil) of simple decision-making rules that
use only one or a few pieces of information can work as well or better than more
complex decision algorithms that use all of the available information (e.g., Brigh-
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ton, 2006; Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999). The recognition heuristic,
for instance, allows for making judgments about which of two alternatives will
be higher on some criterion value by picking the alternative that is more familiar
(e.g., which stock will be more successful or which city is larger; see Gigerenzer &
Goldstein, 1996). Consider the following example. When asked which of two cities
has a larger population, San Diego or San Antonio, most German students tend
to guess right: San Diego, the city with which they are more familiar. American
students who are asked to make the same choice, howe,·er, are more likely to answer incorrectly. This finding is an example of the less-is-more-effect: Only German
students can use the recognition heuristic because American students are equally
familiar with both cities and hence rely on cues other than familiarity, which are
often less valid as predictors of size.
The less-is-more example illustrates that cognitive limitations, such as limited
knowledge or limited processing capacity, can actually be beneficial. In some instances, they can even enable important cognitive functions. The rather small natural limit in our working memory capacity, for instance, facilitates the detection of
correlation coefficients in small samples as the working memory imposes valuable
constraints on the size of the information sample we take into account (Hertwig
& Todd, 2003; Kareev 2000). Another example is provided by the earlier noted
hindsight bias, which can be understood as a byproduct of an adaptive memory
process and learning after feedback (Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000). Once
an additional event occurs, our knowledge is updated to reflect this new information and our knowledge after feedback becomes systematically shifted towards
the new, updated reality. Thus, when the decision maker has to recall an earlier
judgment in the future, the recalled judgment will be closer to the outcome of the
new event than to the original judgment.

PRESENT AND PAST ENVIRO!\IMENTS
The concept of ecological rationality describes the match between structure and
representation of information in the environment on one side, and the simple decision-making algorithms such as heuristics on the other. Whenever this match
exists, heuristics can perform well (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007). Examples of ecologically-rational heuristics can be found m \ anous problem domains such as parenting {Hertwig, Dads, & Sulloway, 2002), mating (Miller & Todd, 1998; Todd, Billari,
& Simao, 2005) and food choice (Scheibehenne, Miesler, & Todd, 2007). Sometimes,
however, it is important to consider the match between mind and the past environments in which the mind evolved. It is this latter focus that can provide insight
into adaptive rationality, insight that is necessary when current and past environments differ.
As an example, consider the work of Wilke (2006) on human foraging behavior
in patchy environmenb, which illustrates that an awareness of ancestral conditions can be the key to understanding human decision-making strategies. When
resources are distributed in patches (i.e., areas with a high density of the resource
surrounded by areas with low density), animals are required not only to make
decisions on where to forage, but also on how long they should forage in a particular patch as resources diminish (Charnov, 1976). Behavioral ecologists have studied simple decision mechanisms that solve this problem of patch time allocation
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(Bell, 1991) and identified resource environments \'\'here these mechanisms work
well (Iwasa, Higashi, & Yamamura, 1981). Different patch-lca\ing strategies are
necessary because resource environments differ in how resources are distributed
across patches. The number of resource items within a patch can either be similar (e\'enly dispersed distributions), completely random (Poisson distribution), or
some patches may only contain a few items while others will be very resource
n(h (aggregated distributions). Wilke and colleagues tested how well humans can
adapt their patch-leaving behavior when faced with such resource distributions
in a computerized foraging game (Hutchinson, Wilke, & Todd, 2008; Wilke, 2006;
Wilke, Hutchinson, & Todd, 2004). The results showed that participants applied
patch-leaving rules that were particularly appropriate for aggregated environments also in other types of environments (e.g., those with evenly dispersed and
Poisson distnbutions). Why was this the case? Were research participants ecologically irratio1111/?
This finding is less puzzling once one considers that aggregation in space and
time, rather than dispersion, is likely to have been the norm for most of the natural resources humans encountered over evolutionary time. Species of plants and
animals rarely, if c\'er, distribute themselves in a purely random manner in their
natural environment, because individual organisms are not independent of one
another: Whereas mutual attraction leads to aggregation for some species, mutual
repulsion leads to regularity (dispersed environments) in others (Taylor, Woiwod,
& Perry, 1978). Most often, these deviations from randomness are in the direction
of aggregation, because aggregation offers considerable benefits such as a common habitat, mating and parenting, or the benefits of group foraging (Krause &
Ruxton, 2002). Since humans have been hunters and gatherers for about 99% of
their lustory (Tooby & DeVore, 1987), it could well be that our evolved psychology
ts adapted to assume such aggregated resource distributions as the default. Thus,
partidpants in the foraging experiment might not have behaved ecologically rationally, but rather l'7. 0/11tio11arily rationally- in the sense that they are behaving in
wa) s th<1t are rational gi\ en the structure of the human evolutionary environment
(c.f. Wilke, Hutchinson, Todd, & Czienskowski, 2009). As \\e discuss later in the
arttfacb section, the idea that humans expect aggregation in space and time also
helps to explain why apparent misconceptions of probability, such as the hot-hand
fallacy (Gilovich et al., 1985), may not reflect fundamental shortcomings of the
human mind.
1

HEURISTICS: SUMMARY
The examples in this section illustrate that in an uncertain world, good decisions
might often require ignoring part of the available information (Gigerenzer, 2000).
Compared to more complex algorithms, heuristics are fast (because the underlying algorithm is simple) and frugal (because they utilize only little information) in
their decbion-making process. In contrast to the classic heuristics and biases viewpoint, these decision strategies can be seen as exquisitely adapted to problems
present and past because simple decision strategies are often truly effective and by
no means weal.. compromises that reveal limitations of the human mind. When
human cognition is studied with respect to real environments, past and present,
heuristics display their full potential by exploiting the structure of information in
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the real world. Ecological and e\olutionary rationality specify the environments in
which heuristics perform well, and adaptive rationality includes both of these.

ERROR MANAGEMENT
Laboratory research on "error" ... attracts a great deal of attention because of what
many take to be its dismal implications for the accuracy of human social reasoning. These implications are illusory, however, because an error is not the same
thing as a "mistake."-Funder (1987, p. 75).
Using heuristics, people can make rapid adaptive decisions using simple and reliable cues, but they are still at risk of making errors. Eliminating errors altogether
is rarely, 1f ever possible, but it is possible to systematically commit one type of
error over another. imagine the problem of reliably identifying a recurrent danger
in the cm ironment such as venomous snakes. For any given relevant percept (e.g.,
a long sine·wy object on the ground), one must make a decision: snake present or
no snake present. Because of the dire consequences of being bitten by a poisonous
snake, it is better to have a low evidentiary threshold for inferring that Jong slender objects are snakes, and to identify every snake you encounter, than to require
too much evidence and occasionally get a costly surprise. Put in more technical
terms, because both types of error cannot be minimized at the same time, asymmetries in the costs of two types of error (false positives and false negatives, also
often labeled false alarms and misses) should lend systems to be biased in the
direction of the least costly error. This is the underlying logic of a recent approach
to signal detection called error management theory (Haselton & Buss, 2000; also
sec Nessc, 2001, on the smoke detector principle, and Wiley, 1994, for a treatment
in animnl behavior).
Error management theory applies evolutionary logic to signal detection theory-an approach to psychophysics derived from statistical decision theory over
50 years ago (Tanner & Swets, 195-l). In signal detection theory, performance in
sensory tasks is understood as a hvo-stage process of discrimination and decision.
People must determine whether some target object (i.e., the signal) is present in
a stimulus, but in addition to the signal, there is not only irrelevant information
in the environment (external noise) but also variability in the organism perceiving it (internal noise). Traditional signal detection analysis explains how decision
criteria will be affected by the differentinl costs of false positives and false negatives. Decision makers must decide whether to adopt a liberal criterion (more false
alarms, fewer misses) or a conservative criterion (fewer false alarms, more misses).
This approach to sensory processes has proved quite fruitful in understanding a
variety of phenomena such as detecting tumors in mammograms and cracks in
airplane wings (see Swets, Dawes, & Monahan, 2002; Swets, 1998).
Until recently, a consideration of the historical fitness costs of errors was not included in the analysis of biases by signal detection theory. Error management theory added this crucial element to an existing powerful tool (also see Wiley, 199-l).
One critical component in the determination of where people will set decision criteria across many domains is the fitness cost associated with different errors. Error
management theory proposes that a cognitive system will be biased in a particular
direction depending on the recurrent cost asymmetry associated with inferences
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in that problem domain. Although error management biases often increase overall
error rates and thus appear irrational, they minimize o\·erall fitness costs. In the
remainder of this section we will describe how error management theory has been
applied to understand perceptual biases, biases invoh ed in dealing with threats
from pathogens and out-group members, and mating decisions. We then describe
potential applications of error management theory in other cognitive domains,
such as language use. Table 2 summarizes the mam studies that have applied error
management theory in these domains.

PERCEPTUAL BIASES
Perception researchers have recently begun to appreciate the important relationship between historical asymmetries in error costs and the design of information
processing systems. For example, Neuhoff (1998) found that listeners perceive
tones with rising intensity to be changing faster than equi\alent tones falling in
intensity. Auditory looming, as the effect has been named, is well explained in an
error management theory framework. The enhanced saliency of rising intensities
associated with approaching objects causes Listeners to reliably underestimate object arrival time. The bias occurs with tones but not broadband noise (Ghazanfar,
Neuhoff, & Logothetis, 2002; Neuhoff, 1998) showing design for sound that not
only provides reliable single-source information, but sound made almost exclusively by biological organisms. Any time a bias affects perception of the actual
physical environment, there are risks of misapplying it to irrelevant objects that
could lead to any variety of costly errors. The degree to which this is trne will
largely determine how advantageous the bias will be, and thus its impact over
evolutionary time. In the case of auditory looming, the costs of false alarms (e.g.,
wasting time by being ready too early) are relatively low compared to the costs of
misses (i.e., not being prepared for an approaching object). The difference in these
costs allows for the selection of a bias that causes people to systematically overestimate a reliable auditory cue of movement towards a listener.
Other researchers have found various perceptual biase<:> that error management
theory explains well. People tend to differentially judge the steepness and distance
of hills relative to flat ground as a function of the perce1\ed difficulty of traversing
them, a potentially adaptive bias tuned to costs of navigat10n effort (see Proffitt,
2006). Viewers also judge heights as greater when looking at a vertical surface
from the top rather than the bottom, reflecting a predicted evolved bias to reduce
costs associated with falling Oackson & Cormack, 2007). These examples illustrate
the powerful role evolution plays in shaping perceptual systems in response to
adaptive problems. What appear objectively to be errors in judgment might actually be beneficial biases that help organisms make decisions that minimize fitness
costs.

REPONSES TO DISEASE AND OUTGROUP THREAT
Protrctizie Biases in Disease Defense. The threat of contaminants and disease is also
likely to have shaped error management biases. Nesse (2001) argued that bodily
systems including allergies and coughing are adapti\ ely over-responsive. These
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TABLE 2. Key Applications of Error Management Theory Supported in the Research literature

~

Domain

Bias

False Positive

False Negative

Cost of False Positive

Cost of False Negative

Type

Pcrtcption

Auditory looming: Tones arc
pcr<eiwd to change fas1cr when
they are ri,ing r.ither th.in falling
e.g., Ghazanlar et al., 2002;

Rising intcn,ities per·
ccivcd to rise faster

Rising intensities per·
ce1vcd to rise more
slowly

Lo" Approaching
objects arrive later
than expected (e.g., a
f.tlling rock)

High. Approaching objects arnvc
eJrlier than e~pectcd (e.g., a
falling rockI; failure to avoid
object

Paranoid

Perception

Overestimate stecpnC<>' of hills
(e.g., Proffitt. 20061

Perceive hills as stcq>er
and farther away than
they .idually .ire

Perceive hills a> gentler,
rolling. and clO<>Cr
than they actually are

Low: Miss out on
rl'SOurccs in difficult
terrain

High: Expend considerable
energy traversing very difficult
terrain

Paranoid

Perception

Owrestunate heights when look·
ing at vertical surface from
top compared to bottom le.g.,
lackson & Connack, 20071

OvcrL"timate height
when looking down
from top

Underestimate height
when loo~ing down
from top

Low: More cautious
.1round dangerous
heights

High: l e<>s cautious around dan·
gerou~ heights

P.sranoid

Disease

Rejecting food that is actually
edible (e.g.. Garcia, Hankins, ,'l,
Rusiniak, 1976: Rozin & Kalal,

Avoiding a food that ts
usually harrnle,;s

Eating food th.it is
harmful

Low: Mi" out on potenlial food source

High: Sickness or death as a result
of eating dangerous food

Paranoid

Disease

Avoid individuals with noncontagiou; phy,ical afflictions (e.g.,
Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Park el
al., 2001)

Avoid a pcrwn who is
not 1nfectiou'

Commune with a person
who is infectious

Variable, potentially low:
miso;ccl wcial partner

High: Become infected. gct sick,
and potentially die

Paranoid

Disease

Physical overrespon-.e to disease
threats re.g., Nesse, 2001)

Unnecessarily strong
reaction to disc.isc or
nondiseao;e agent

So reaction or weak
reaction to disease
agent

Variable, potentially
low: Waste energy
by mounting ph)sical
response

High: Be.:ome infected. get sick,
and potenttally die

Paranoid

Conflict&.
Cooperation

Individuals are prO'>OClal even rn
~ituations \'there they don't n<.'Cd
to he \Y,1magishi et .ii., 2003.
2007)

Infer that one's selfish·
ness might be clctccled
by others even when
it's not

Infer that one's selfishncss might not be
detecu>d by othe~
e•cn though ii is

Variable, potentially low:
Lc,,;c romc rewuRes
unnecessarily

Vari.iblc>, potentially high: Earn
negative reputation .ind risk
'>Ol:ial ostraci<m

Paranoid

Fear harmll'Ss outgroup mcmhcrs
(e.g., Maner et al., 2005;
Schaller et al.. 2003)

Assume outgroup mcm·
ber' .ire ha<;tile \'then
they are not

Assume outgroup mem·
bcrs are friendly when
they are hostile

Variabil', potentially
low: Mis> potential
cooperation partner

Very high: Unprepared for Jtta<:k
or c•ploilalion by oulgroup
m£'mllt'rs

Paranoid

Neuhoff, 1998

1971

Conflict &
Coop<·ration

::t

>
VI
rn

!:;

0

z

rn
-4

>
r

Highly Vilriable, potentially
very high: failure to exploit
opponent for re.ourccs; lowc.r
l'E"Olve again't enemy; preemptive surrender

Optimistic

Often low: wasted court·
ship effort

High: missed reproductive opportunity

Optimistic

Inferring lack of commiiment intent when
there is commitment
intent

High: Desertion

Low· Dcla>·ed start to reproduction

Paranoid

Assuming sexual coer·
civcncss when tht>re
is none

Failing to detect o;cxual

Low: Mis"><.-<l opportunity
for '><Xial interaction
partner

Very high: Un"anted pregnancy;

Underperception of romantic
partner's forgivene!>s after a
transgr5sion ie.g., Frie.en et
al., 2005!

Assuming partner has
fully forgiven when s/
he hJs not

Assuming partner has
not fully forgiven
when <Jhe has

Potentially high; Partner's
resentment might
diminish rdalionship
stability

Low: Extra time and energy spent
trying to appease partner

Paranoid

,\1en's overestimation of likelihood
that current partner has been
sexually unfaithful (Andrews ct
al., in press)

Assuming partner
unfaithfulness when
partner was faithful

Failure to detect partner
infidelity

Variable, potentially
high: loss of trust in
partner; possible alienation of partner

Very high: Lost reproductive

PJranoid

Assume weakne5s
relative to opponent
when one is actually
stronger

Highly Vilriable: Engag·
ing in conflict with
stronger force

Inferring intL>rC$1 when
there is none

Inferring no intcrc-;t
when there is interest

Women's undcrpeKeption of
men's commitment intent
(Haselton & Buss, 2000)

Inferring commitment
intent when then• is
none

Women's overperception of men's
<.exual coerciveness at high
fertility (e.g., Garver-Apgar et
al., 2007)

Mating

Mating

Conflict&
Cooperation

Be overconfident of one's abilities
in wars and competitions (e.g.,
John..on, 2004; Johnson et al.,
2006)

Assume strength relative
to opponent when one
ls actually not stronger

Men's ovcrperccption of women's
sexual intert!'t (e.g.• Haselton,
2003; Maner et al., 2005)

>
~
"1:1

-I

<
...,
;II;)

Mating

Mating

Mating

coerciveness

~

6
z

>
,...
=4
-<

Parannid

1>liminat1on of iemal1> choice

opportunity; Investment of
resources in offspring not one's
O\vn; loss oi partner

:-.:ote. The table presents -;elected examples of findings that can be Interpreted in the Error Management fral'TK'WOrk. The biases arc categorized as paranoid (assuming that the state of the world is
less desirable than it is in reality) or optimistic (assuming that the state of the world is more desirable than ii i• In reality). Adapted from Ha,elton and ,..,.ettle {2006"

"....
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systems are triggered in the absence of a real threat, and dampening their responses with drugs or by other means typically results in few negative outcomes. This
is so, he argued, because the costs of being over-responsive arc small compared to
the cost of being under-responsive to the pathogenic threats these defenses help
to combat.
The same logic applies to food aversions, particularly in environments in which
food is abundant. Aversions to specific foods are reliably acquired in human and
nonhuman animals following just a single incidence of sickness after eating a specific food (Garcia, Ilankins, & Rusiniak, 1976; Rozin & Kalat, 1971). Even if these
sicknesses were caused by something other than the food, systematically erring
on the side of caution and avoiding food associated with sickness would often
enhance survival in food-abundant em ironments more than erring on the side of
excessive permissiveness in food choices.
If other people posed reliable threats of disease throughout e\olutionary history
(see Schaller & Duncan, 2007), humans could also possess adaptive biases that lead
them to feel disgusted by and selectively avoid certain classes of others. One cue of
disease that may precipitate such avoidance is the presence of physical abnormalities, including lesions, discoloration, impaired motor function, and atypical appearance of body parts. These cues might also indicate a history of accidents (e.g.,
falling) or bodily harm inflicted by others, each of which is not a communicable
threat. The multiple factors that can cause physical disfigurement produce a signal
detection problem with a serious consequence: because it is difficult to know with
certainty the source of a physical anomaly, error management logic predicts that
humans will err on the side of avoidance and treat phenotypicaJJy atypical others
as if they are vectors of disease even when they are not. Kurzban and Leary (2001)
proposed precisely this logic as an explanation for the pervasiveness of stigma associated with physical disabilities.
Recent research has directly tested this error management hypothesis about
disease and disability. The \\.Ork c;howed that people who perceive that they are
vulnerable to disease are less likely to have disabled friends (Park, Faulkner, &
Schaller, 2003). In addition, in reaction time studies, participants exposed to a disease prime unwittingly associated diseac;e with well-known noncontagious indi\ iduals with disabilities, more so than with nondisabled individuals (Park et al.,
2003). These results support the view that rather than being irrational, stigma surrounding disabled individuals is part of an evolved disease avoidance system that
errs on the side of caution.

Protecth1c Biases i11 Response to 011tgro11p Threat. Similar error management logic
applies to outgroup threat. For ancestral humans, the cost of falsely assuming that
outgroups were peaceful, and consequently being unprepared for an aggressive
assault, would often have outweighed the comparatively lower cost of maintaining increased wariness toward friendly outgroup members. This reasoning is consistent with research showing that members of competing coalitions or out-groups
are believed to be less bene\·olent (Brewer, 1979) and more hostile (Quillian & Pager, 2001) than are members of their own group. These biases can be strengthened
by ecologically-\·alid contextual cues. For example, when there is ambient darkness rather than ambient light, individuals face greater risks of being attacked. In
laboratory research manipulating light levels, participants tested in dark conditions had greater beliefs that out-group males are violent than those tested in the
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light (Schaller, Park, & Faulkner, 2003; Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 2003). Similarly,
when induced to feel fear, participants saw more anger in the neutral faces of outgroup males as compared to those induced to feel romantic arousal or in a neutral
emotion condition (Maner et al., 2005). In sum, a variety of findings reveal a bias
toward assuming that outgroup members arc dangerous, especially when under
conditions of increased threat.
Beyond these examples, error management logic applies in a wide array of domains relating to conflict and cooperation with others, including social exchange
(Yamagishi, Tanida, Mashima, Shimoma, & Kanazawa, 2003; Yamagishi, Terai,
Kiyonari, Mifune, & Kanazawa, 2007), overconfidence in war and competitions
Gohnson, 2004; Johnson et al., 2006), and beliefs about the intentions of others (Barrett, Todd, Miller, & Blythe, 2005). With respect to the latter, for example, Barrett
et al. (2005) showed adults animations of a variety of social interactions involving only naturalistic motion cues (modeled after Heider & Simmel, 194-1). In the
study, both German adults and Shuar hunter-horticulturalisb from Ecuador were
accurate m 1udging a variety of intention patterns, including chasing, following,
courting, and so forth. The viewers in each group also had a systematic false alarm
bias such that they inferred chasing when chasing was not present more so than
the same false alarm for other intention categories. The authors of the study speculated that this pattern could reflect a universal error management bias designed to
avoid the high costs of missing malevolent intentions in others.
BIASES IN MATING AND ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS

The previous sections show that many biases have probably evolved to cope with
physical threats posed by the environment or other organisms. Error management
theory has also been useful for identifying and classifying biases in the domain
of mnting. Jn this section, we describe a number of biases that people show when
assessing the intentions of potential or current mates. We begin by reviewing the
evidence pertaining to the most well-known error management hypothesis-the
male sexual overperception hypothesis.

Sexual Ot1erpercept1011 by Men. In the ancestral past, men more so than women
gained fitness advantages by engaging in opportunistic sexual encounters "'ith
multiple partners (Trivers, 1972). The logic behind this proposal is that the sex
with fewer obligatory investments in offspring (pregnancy, lactation) and higher
reproductive potential (i.e., number of offspring which possibly could be produced), most often the male, substantially increased offspring number by mating
more often. In contrast, for females, the costs of such a quantity-oriented strategy
often outweighed the benefits. Women, for example, incurred tremendous costs as
a result of having sex, including a minimum of nine months of pregnancy and a
substantial lactation period. Only when the benefits of reproduction with a particular mate outweighed these costs did women benefit from having sex. As a result,
men are generally more sexually eager than women and thus often more willing to engage in short-term uncommitted sexual relationships (Clark & Hatfield,
1989; Li & Kenrick, 2006) and with more partners (Schmitt et al., 2003; Simpson &
Gangestad, 1991). Relative to men, women are more selective in their choice of sex
partners and often require indications that partners will invest time and resources
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before sex, during pregnancy, and throughout child rearing (Buss & Schmitt, 1993;
Pillsworth & l laselton, 2006b).
Because men benefited more than women from short-term sexual encounters
and more sexual partners, men have probably been selected for a keen ability to
recognize cues of female sexual interest. This judgment, however, is made under
considerable uncertainty and is prone to error. An error management perspective predicts that inaccurate judgments should be systematically biased toward
overperception-perceiving sexual interest when there is none. It is plausible that
an overestimation bias for men was selected because missing a sexual opportunity due to underestimating sexual interest would have been more reproductively
costly than wasted time pursuing a disinterested woman due to overestimating
sexual interest.
Many studies using diverse methods support the sexual overperception prediction. These methods have included judging sexual interest or intent in face-toface interactions of opposite-sex stranger dyads (Abbey, 1982; Harnish, Abbey, &
DeBono, 1990; Saal, Johnson, & Weber, 1989; Shea, 1993), videotaped interactions
and/or photos (Abbey, Cozzarelli, McLaughlin, & Harnish, 1987; Abbey & Melby,
1986; Edmondson & Conger, 1995; Saal ct al., 1989; Shotland & Craig, 1988), vignettes (Abbey & Harnish, 1995, DeSouza, Pierce, Zanelli, & Hutz, 1992; Haselton
& Buss, 2000; Kowalski, 1993), naturalistic personal experiences (Haselton, 2003;
Koenig, Kirkpatrick, & Ketelaar, 2007), and experiments (Maner et al., 2005).
For example, in a typical unscripted live or videotaped lab interaction study
(e.g., Abbey, 1982), male observers judged female participants' sexual interest toward the male participant to be higher than did female observers, and higher than
what the female participants themselves reported. This finding shows that men
overestimate women's sexual interest relative to two potential baseline comparison points (judgments of other women and the reports of women themselves). In a
representative vignette study (Haselton & Buss, 2000), male respondents inferred
more sexual interest than did female respondents from a range of hypothetical
behaviors enacted by a third-party woman in a fictitious dating scenario.
These results are not simply due to men overstating the sexual interest of all
people. There is no consistent evidence of a directional bias when men judge other
men's sexual interest (e.g., Abbey, 1982; Haselton & Buss, 2000). The bias is also
not shared by women, who appear to l'ithcr underperceive men's sexual interest
(e.g., Abbey, 1982) or sho"" no clear directional bias (e.g., Haselton & Buss, 2000),
depending on the study. Overall, these findings point to a consistent sex difference in judging the sexual interest of opposite-sex individuals: men overperceive
women's (and only women's) sexual interest, but not \'ice versa. Men's misperception bias appears to be further limited to women who are appropriate sex partners,
so for instance, it is absent when men rate their sisters' sexual interest (Haselton
& Buss, 2000).
The results amassed from these interaction studies are corroborated by naturalistic survey data. for example, Haselton (2003) asked responders to report past
instances in whic.h their sexual intentions (or lack thereof) were misperceived
by opposite-sex other::., and found that women, unlike men, reported episodes
of overperccption more often than underpcrception. Another study found that in
opposite-sex college friendship dyads, men tended to rate the sexual interest of
close female friends more highly than those female friends rated their own interest, whereas the reverse was true for women's ratings of their male friend's
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interest (Koenig et al., 2007). The same predicted pattern of sex differences is revealed in research examining perception of affect. A recent study asked men and
women to infer emotions ("microexpressions") in photographed faces that were
actually emotionally neutral, and found that men who were induced to be in a
romantic mood inferred more sexual arousal in female faces relative to men in a
neutral mood, whereas women in a romantic mood did not exhibit the same shift
when assessing male facial expressions (Maner et al., 2005). Another recent study
failed to find evidence of the predicted sexual overperception effect. The authors
concluded that men may simply be generally bad at decoding sexual vs. friendly
cues rather than biased toward false positive errors (Farris, Treat, Viken, & McFall,
2008). However, given the abundance of the evidence showing that men's bias is
directional (biased toward over- rather than under-perception), this result appears
to be an anomaly.

Percepfio11s of Men's Com111if111ent Intent: A Healthy Dose of Skepticism. Women's
reproduction requires substantial obligatory investment in offspring during pregnancy and childrearing (Pillsworth & Haselton, 2006b; Trivers, 1972). These requirements have likely shaped women's preferences for mates who display convincing cues of long-term commitment and thus appear to be willing to provide
resources during pregnancy and beyond (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). As with sexual intent, perceptions of commitment intent are prone to error due to incomplete information and an incentive for men to exaggerate their commitment (Haselton, Buss,
Oubaid, & Angleitner, 2005). Error management theory predicts a directional bias
for these errors: women should underestimate men's commitment intent rather
than overestimate it. This is so because becoming pregnant and being deserted by
a male partner as a result of overestimated commitment would have been more
reproductively costly than temporarily delaying reproduction due to underestimated commitment (e.g., awaiting more evidence of commitment before having
sex).
This prediction has not been tested as extensively as sexual overperception, but
research has supported it. Using the same vignette scenarios as described above,
Haselton and Buss (2000) asked participants to rate the likelihood that a variety of
dating behaviors indicated an interest in a long-term romantic relationship. The
results showed that female respondents inferred less long-term interest when men
engaged in these behaviors (i.e., less commitment intent) than did male respondents. No such sex differences emerged in rating women's long-term interest from
identical behaviors (Haselton & Buss, 2000; also see Haselton et al., 2005, for a
discussion of additional evidence).
Perceptions of Men's Sexual Coerciveness Across the Ovulatory Cycle. An error management approach also predicts adaptive changes in the psychology of individuals across time based on cues indicating changes in the relative costs of false positive and false negative errors (Haselton & Nettle, 2006). One notable type of shift
occurs in women across the ovulatory cycle: the costs of having sex with an undesirable partner rise as ovulation approaches and fertility increases (Gangestad
& Thornhill, 2008; Pillsworth & Haselton, 2006a). Error management logic thus
predicts that women will be particularly wary of sexual coercion when fertility
is high-facilitated by erring on the side of overestimating sexual coerciveness
in men. This is precisely what a recent study found: women in the high-fertility
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phase of the cycle rated men appearing in videotaped interactions with women
as more sexua lly coercive than did women in other cycle phases (Garver-Apgar,
Gangestad, & Simpson, 2007).
Other Mating-Rrlated Bwses. Error management theory has also been applied to
iudgment biases in other mating-related domains, including underestimating the
extent to which one has been forgiven by a romantic partner after a transgression
(thus prompting a more complete mending of the relationship; Friesen, Fletcher, &
Overall, 2005), overestimating the desirability of same-sex competitors (possibly
to facilitate keener competition, Hill, 2007), and men overestimating the chances
that their romantic partners have been sexually unfaithful (to protect against the
high costs of cuckoldry; Andrews et al., 2008; also see Haselton & Nettle, 2006, for
a' ariety of additional predictions not yet tested). In sum, across the many judgments and decisions people make in the courtship context, there are many biases
that were predicted by and are sensible in light of error management theory.

ERROR MANAGEMENT: SUMMARY
These examples, like those in the heuristics section, demonstrate that biases often are not flaws that reveal fundamental irrationality of the mind. Rather, error
management biases are solutions that minimize particularly costly errors and produce a net benefit to the decision maker. In contrast to common assumptions, the
logic of error management shows that 5uperior designs are not always those that
maximize accu1acy but are systematically biased to commit the least costly error.
The direction of an error management bias-whether it is optimistic as in the case
of sexual overperception or parn11oid as in the case of disease avoidance-differs
depending on the domain of decision, traits of the perceiver (e.g., male\ s. female),
and contextual cues indicating shifting costs and benefib (Haselton & Nettle,
2006). Successful hypotheses about the direction of bias often require models of
the ancestral past and thus demonstrate the power of evolutionary thinking for
understanding what othen'Vise might be deemed quirky features of the mind.
ARTIFACTS

A criticism of the classic heuristics and biases approach is that the strategies often
used for identifying bias and e\ aluating cognitive performance might not be appropriate. lf researchers place humans in unnatural settings, present problems for
which the humnn mind is not designed, or evaluate performance in reference to
standards other than those which would have aided our ancestors in survival and
reproduction, it should not come as n surprise that humans appear systematically
irrational. The third and final category in our evolutionary taxonomy of bias, artifacts, contains phenomena that are subject to these criticisms. We give two general
examples within this category: (1) those resulting from the use of evolutionari ly
invalid problem formats or problem contents and, (2) evaluation in reference to
normative standards that are not reasonable models of the evolved mind.
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EVOLUTIONARILY-INVALID PROBLEM FORMATS AND CONTENTS

Frequencies Versus Probabilities. Many of the shortcomings of human reasoning
claimed in the heuristics and biases literature concern failures in estimating event
probabihhes or likelihoods (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983). Spurring a long
and active debate, Gigerenzer (1997), Cosmides and Tooby (1996), and others have
suggested that people should demonstrate proficiency at likelihood estimation
when presented with input in the form of discrete events-11nt11ml freq11encie<>-as
compared with numerical probabilities. Thus, investigations of likelihood estimation will be compromised when researchers do not use natural frequencies. The
argument is that frequencies of events are observable in nature, whereas probabilitiec; are mathematical abstractions that lack any direct connection to sensory
input (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1997). In addition, when computing probabilities one losec;
information about base rates (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996), so frequencies actually
convey superior information.
To illustrate, consider the famous Linda problem. Respondents read a personality
dec;cription: "l inda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored
in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations." They
were then asked to determine which of two options was more probable: (a) Linda
is a bank teller, or (b) Linda is a bank teller and active m the feminist movement.
Between 80% and 90°'0 of respondents selected the second of the two-Linda is a
bank teller and active in the feminist movement-as the more probable option,
even though the conjunction of the two options cannot be more likely that either
of its components. I lence, people committed the conjunction fallacy (Tversky &
Kaheman, 1983).
As a test of the natural frequency hypothesis, several researchers presented classic problems in frequency rather than probability format (e.g., how many out of
200 women arc bank tellers and how many out of 200 arc bank tellers and femini<:>ts), and found that frequencies dramatically 1mpro\'cd performance (Cosmides
& Tooby, 1996; Fiedler, 1988; Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman,
1983; but see Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Gaissmaier, Straubinger, & funder, 2007;
and Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 2007, for a recent round of debate surrounding these
studies) Improving performance by providing natural frequencies as input has
implications that go beyond our general point about e\ olutionarily valid problem
formats. ln contrast to the ancestral world, in modern contexts such as medical
diagnosb exa(t numerical probability judgments are often crucial, and it is important to give decision-makers information in a form they can easily use (Hoffrage,
Lind<>ey, I lertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000). Training doctors to translate diagnosis
problems into natural frequencies has shown to be three times as effective in helping them correctly reason about outcomes as compared with traditional rule-based
training (Kurzcnhauser & Hoffrage, 2002).
Problem Content; Cheater Detection. Often researchers compare human performance to idealized mies of logic or mathematics. From an evolutionary perspectiYe, however, the important problems of judgment arc not so abstract. They involve dilemmas such as determining whether foods are safe to eat, who to choose
as a mate, whether a patch of land will contain food resources, and who is a cheater in a social exchange. People find falsification logic neither intuiti\ e nor easy
to use, as an) one who has taught statistics knows. It does not come as a surprise
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then, that people are not especially good at testing the abstract conditional rule,

if p then q. In classic studies, Wason (1983) showed that people easily recognized

that confirmatory evidence (the presence of p) is needed to test the conditional,
but they often failed to test for falsifications (the absence of q). In the same line of
research, howe\'er, problems involving particular contents dramatically changed
performance on the task (e.g., Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, & Lcgrenzi, 1972, Wason
& Shapiro, 1971). Cosmides (1989) argued that the operation of a cheater-detection
algorithm could explain many of these content effects. She argued that when the
conditional rule involves social exchange (if you take the benefit, p, then you pay
the cost, q), people look not only for confirmatory evidence (benefits taken, p) but
also disconfirmatory e\ idence (cost not paid, not q). These contents changed performance from 25~o correct (Wason, 1983) to 75% correct (Cosmides, 1989) Cosmides (1989) proposed that the performance differed because the content elicited
mechanisms for cheater detection, which used falsification logic, given the nature
of the adaptive problem to be solved (Cosmides, 1989; fiddick, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2000; see Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, for an extensive discussion, including a
description of the many variants of the task devised to rule out confounds and
alternative explanations; also see Pereya, 2000, for similar content effects involving
hazard detection).
An important point in this work is that humans do not reason according to the
rules of abstract logic, but instead reason according to the task demands of specific adaptive information-processing problems. This is nicely demonstrated by
manipulations in which adaptive responses systematically violate normative rules
(e.g., switched social contracts, Cosmides, 1989). Proper adaptive functioning of
the mind can only be observed when people encounter content that their minds
are designed to handle.
QUESTIONING NORMATIVE STANDARDS
AS GOOD MODELS OF THE EVOLVED MIND

In order to judge behavior as rational or not, there must be a standard for comparison-achieving accuracy, adherence to a logical rule, or maximizing some outcome. We have already questioned the standard of accuracy or truth-although
adapth e systems should achieve reasonable accuracy, trade-offs in error costs often render systems biased toward particular errors superior to those maximizing
accuracy. The cheater-detection example demonstrates that abstract logical rules
often do not fit with the practical problems human beings must solve. The following are several other cases with questionable standards for comparison when the
goal is to evaluate whether the mind is well designed.

The Hot-Hand Fallacy. The hot-hand fallacy occurs when research participants
expect lucky streaks in hits and misses in everything from basketball to coin tosses
(Gilovich et al., 1985) when in fact the probabilities of events are independent.
When Kobe Bryant hits many shots in a row, for instance, the natural expectation
is that he's got a hot hand and will shoot another successfully. People are often
surprised to discover that this strong intuition does not square with the reality
that the success of the next shot is determined independently from the shot be·
fore it. Heuristics and biases researchers attribute demonstrations of the hot-hand
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phenomenon to humans' poor conceptions of chnnce, owing to the use of the fallible representntivencss heuristic (Gilovich ct al, 1985), in which participants mistakenly inferred that the small, obserYed sequence is representative of the larger
sample as a whole.
The fornging example presented in the heuristics section hints at an alterative
explanation for the hot hand phenomenon. Wilke and Barrett (2009) proposed that
prior researcher.., might have started from the wrong pince by asking why people
are bad at random events and judging evolutionarily no\'el events like coin tosses,
gambling, and sports. Instead, one can ask about the structure of objects and events
surrounding important adaptive problems faced by our ancestors, and what kinds
of adaptations might have been shaped by selection. Wilke and Barrett argued thnt
mnny of these-plants, animals, human settlements, and even weather-would
h,1\ e been organized in an aggregated, clumpy fashion (Taylor, 1961; Taylor et al.,
1978) -not perfectly at random (independent) like events in Las Vegas. Thus, the
default human expectation is aggregation, dumpiness, and nonindependence.
To explore this hypothesis, Wilke and Barrett (2009) devised computer tasks in
which pnrticipants could forage for fruits, com tosses, and several other kinds of
resources, and presented them to American undergraduates and a South American
indigenous population of hunter-horticulturalists (the Shuar). In each population,
research participants exhibited the hot-hand phenomenon for all resource types,
despite the fact that the resources were distributed randomly by the computer.
The exception was for coin tosses for the American students only, in which the
hot-hand expectation was reduced though not altogether eliminated. Wilke and
Bnrrett (2009) concluded that the expectation of aggregation in space and time may
be the psychological default that is overcome only through extensive experience
with truly independent random phenomena like coin tosses. This conclusion is
quite different from the original explanation offered for the phenomenon-that it
is attributable to the fallible representativeness heuristic and thus is a shortcoming
of the mind .

Future Di~co1111ting. When evaluated against many standards of economic utility,
humans have a tendency to oven alue immediate benefits relative to long-term
gains (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002). For example, a person who
prefers a reward of $10 today over a reward of $12 tomorro\<\ is discounting the
future. Much of the past research on the topic has investigated negative outcomes
such as poorer academic performance and increased abuse of psychoactive substances that are experienced by high future discounters (e.g., Gottdiencr, Murawski, & Kucharski, 2008), leading researchers to label people who prefer immediate rewards with terms like impulsive, short-sighted, lacking self-control, and
ego-control failure (e.g., Ainslie, 1974; Gottdiener ct al., 2008; Green, 1982; Logue,
1988; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989; Rachlin & Green, 1972). The clear message from this literature is that preferring immediate rewards over later rewards is
irrational a puale to be solved.
Again, might the research question be set up backwards? Rather than simply
noting mismatches between human preferences and monetary maximization, and
seeking to explain the lapse in rationality, one could begin by asking how the ps1chology of intertemporal choice might reasonably have been shaped by evolution.
atural selection favors discounting the future and taking immediate rewards
\<\hen the costs of waiting outweigh the benefits of waiting. These include the real
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possibility that an organism could die before living to the future date to reap the
reward, thus forfeiting the chance to translate the resource into the currency of reproduction (e.g., Daly & Wilson, 2005). Female parasitic wasps, for example, shift
their egg-laying depending on changes in barometric pressure linked with the approach of deadly thunderstorms. The wasps lay more eggs on low-quality patches
in a chamber mimicking the conditions of an incoming thunderstorm (rapidly
dropping barometric pressure) than on a fair summer day (steady barometric pressure). Rather than delaying to search for a better option, wasps deposit their eggs
immediately in a poor patch in order to avoid reproductive failure (Roitberg, Sircom, Roitberg, van Alphen, & Mangel, 1993). These results square with theorizing
by some economists that future discounting is steep because there is uncertainty
about the future (e.g., the individual might die before collecting the later reward),
but these ideas have often lacked explicit considerations of the evolved mechanisms giving rise to steep discount rates.
Humans also show adaptive shifts in future discounting in response to changing
conditions in the physical and social environment. For example, Wilson and Daly
(2004) reasoned that cues indicating good returns on immediate efforts should
lead to discounting the future more steeply. They predicted that exposure to attractive women would inspire men to become more present-oriented, possibly
as a motivation to pursue immediate mating opportunities. Consistent with the
hypothesis, men displayed greater financial future discounting after exposure to
attractive women compared to when they were exposed to average women. This
shift might be part of a broader system that reorients individuals to become more
present-oriented when faced with opportunities that require immediate action.
The above logic indicates that discounting the future can be adaptive. One form
of discounting that has resisted explanation, however, is the preference reversal
under conditions of \'ariable delays. An example is when a person accepts $10 immediately rather than $11 tomorrow, but prefers to accept $11 in 366 days rather
than $10 in 365 days. In the first case, the person is impulsive; in the second case,
he or she is patient. Putting aside the issue of transaction costs-it requires more
effort to come back at a future date than to receive money immediately-why
might these preference reversals occur?
One possibility is that different evolved systems are recruited when making
these decisions. The first system manages choices between an immediate and a
delayed reward (e.g., $10 now or $11 tomorrow), whereas the second system manages choices between a delayed and further delayed reward (e.g., $10 in 365 days
or $11 in 366 days; McClure, Ericson, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2007; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). Using fMRI methods, McClure and
colleagues found support for the idea that the prospect of an immediate reward
activates limbic system reward-related areas that are rich in dopaminergic innervation and are linked to impulsive behavior. The activation of the limbic system
may prompt organisms to act immediately to secure the available rewards. In
contrast, being presented with the choice of two delayed rewards activates prefrontal and parietal areas of the brain associated with deliberative processes and
numerical computation. Although the precise adaptive functions of these brain
areas remain to be specified, research along these lines demonstrates how thinking
about whether systems with different functions are recruited to solve superficially
similar problems can provide insights into why there are these apparent lapses in
rationality.
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ARTlfACTS: SUMMARY

We have presented just a few examples to illustrate how a reconsideration of the
standards used to judge performance can radically change conclusions about human rationality. Bv asking what information would have been available over human e\olutionary history as inputs for problem solving, what counts as a good
solution within content domains crucial for survival and reproduction, and what
ends humans should have evolved to maximize, we flip many of the conclusions
drawn by heuristics and biases researchers on their heads. Instead of noting the
mismatches between human performance and modern, idealized standards-and
concluding that the mind is compromised in some way-evolutionary minded
researchers reveal good solutions with a tight fit to enduring natural problems that
may sometimes perform at their worst in the peculiar modem world.

DISCUSSION
ADAPTIVE RATIONALITY A D SPECIALIZED, EVOLVED DESIGN

A major theme emerging from our evolutionary analysis is the importance of specialized, e\'Ol\'ed design: humans are adaptively rational to the extent that their
minds are well designed for recurrent problems affoctmg surviva l and reproduction. We argue that the pendulum should continue to swing away from a focus on
bias and error and toward developing models of the crucial adaptive problems
our ancestors needed to solve, including realistic assessments of what information
humans had available to them. In short, researchers benefit from developing models of design solutions to problems of judgment and decision making faced over
millennia, and conducting research to test them. As demonstrated by the many
examples presented in this article, once these models are developed and tested,
the mind shows a remarkably tight fit to naturalistic human challenges. From this
perspective, the mind appears reasonable, even rational. The emerging picture
produced by these newer breeds of explanation is quite different from the heavy
emphasis on irrationality in earlier treatments of heuristics and biases (see Lopes,
1991; Krueger & Funder, 2004).
The strategy of focusing on and elucidating good design is not an apologia intended to place the rational mind on a pedestal just for admiration: it is practical.
Doing so should achieve at least four desirable outcomes. First, we take the success of key examples in this paper-ecologically rational simple heuristics, auditory looming and other error management phenomena, improving probability
judgment with frequency formats, and so on-as an indication that researchers
can achieve a clearer view of the architecture of the mind by using an evolutionary
theoretical approach. Scientific progress will not grind to a halt without the approach, but surely researchers benefit from considering whether their theoretical
assumptions and psychological models are evolutionarily sensible. Second, if we
are correct that many bias and error phenomena are artifacts of unnatural research
settings or questionable normative standards, the approach could help researchers "clean house" and focus instead on the phenomena likely to have more impact
on humans' daily thoughts and beha\ iors (Haselton & Funder, 2006). Third, this
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strategy helps expose cases in which the evolved design of the mind is at odds
with the demands of the modern environment, a point we elaborate below. And,
fourth, it helps researchers sort through bias and error phenomena to determine
which are actually reasonable feature!-> of the mind, and which are true oddities.
Where there arc these real mysteries, there are exciting discoveries to be made.

TAXONOMY OF BIASES
Our threefold taxonomy of biases and heuristics, error management effects and
design artifacts does not perfectly organize biases into mutually exclusive categories. Rather, we offer this taxonomy as a tool for e\.aluating the causes of apparent
lapses in rationality. For instance, our discussion on the hot-hand phenomenon
and our suggestion that it serves as an adaptation to detect aggregation in the
world (rather than being a fallacious perception about random sequences), can
also be tackled from an error management perspective. If missing a resource pattern would have been so costly in past environments, then we might expect our
perceptual system to more often falsely perceive the presence than the absence of
a pattern than fail to do so (c.f. Nesse, 2001). Similarly, some biases of the social
psychology literature can be considered as heuristics that contain elements of error
management. For example, self-enhancement may result from an error as} mmctry
in which false modesty is more costly than mistaken pride (Krueger & Mueller,
2002).

OPEN VERSUS CLOSED DEVCLOPMENTAL SYSTEMS
Many readers arc surely wondering where cxperience--lcaming-is in our analysis. An important question for all rescarLh on psychological adaptations is to what
extent any adaptation is de\. elopmentally closed, such that in nearly all typical developmental environments the same general design will emerge, or developmentally open to influence by environmental contingencies (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992;
Mayr, 1974). Whether systems for making judgments and decisions are open or
closed should depend on the demands of the adaptive problem, and thus the nature and extent of environmental influence should be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis. Taking error management biases, for instance, Haselton and Nettle (2006)
reasoned that systems of food a\. ersion and snake fear are relatively developmentally closed since they appear only to require triggering by the environment and
other, more deadly modem hazards do not show the same conservative patterning
(e.g., fast-moving automobiles and obesity, which are much more likely to kill us).
On the other hand, error management biases relating to optimism about achieving
future benefits (positi\'e illusions) appear much more open to environmental influence and they show greater variation in their manifestations across societies (sec
Haselton & Nettle, 2006, for a re\ icw).
Clearly, there are some learning systems that are sufficiently wide open that they
can produce completely novel reasoning skills, such as how to do calculus or that
coin flips in a series are truly independent. These skills arc subjectively difficult.
The fact that they require much practice and effort serves as a reminder that not
all reasoning skills are equally leamablc. The key point for this discussion i!; that
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some e\ oln?d systems of judgment, reasoning, and decision-making are deeply
entrenched and less responsive to alteration to any differing demands presented
by the modern world, whereas others adapt more smoothly.

rROM THE PAST TO THE PRESENT
In closing, we wish to note that the approach ""e advocate does not necessarily
diminish the lessons learned in earlier research. The modern world is governed by
novel economic rules and new social challenges. Knowledge of how our evolved
psychology leads us to behave in ways that contrast"" ith our self-interest in light
of these rules should prove important to human happiness: what benefited our ancestors' reproductive success is often at odds with our own wishes for how to live.
Where there are these clash points, only by understanding each of the two piecesthc psychological adaptations in question and the modern context in which they
operate- -can we have the knowledge required to choose the best course of action.
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